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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores several issues on family economics. Chapter 2 uses a large and nation-
ally representative sample to investigate the effects on children’s education from their grandparents
and extended families including uncles and aunts. Chapter 3 compares warm glow and pure altru-
ism when they are both used to model parental love. The comparison focuses on their implications
for fertility decisions and educational investments in the children. Chapter 4 studies the fertil-
ity and education investment choices of parents when they hold both pure altruism towards their
children and hyperbolic discounting preferences of their own.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
This dissertation focuses on family economics. More specifically, I have explored how grand-
parents and the extended families influence the grandchildren’s education, and how parents with
different preferences make decisions about fertility and educational investments in their children.
The behaviors of members within a family are so interconnected that a family is a better repre-
sentative unit of a society than an individual. That is to say, aggregating the behaviors of families
can provide us with a more accurate map of the economy than aggregating those of individuals.
Chapter 2 (joint with Minghao Li) uses empirical methods to explore the influence of grand-
parents and extended families on grandchildren’s education. Our paper is the first to measure
multi-generational social mobility with a nationally representative data set in China. First, we
find that the education of grandfathers is positively correlated with the education of grandchildren.
Second, we explore uncle and aunt effects, which are often neglected in previous research due to
data limitations. Third, our paper shows that grandparent effects will decrease after the inclusion
of uncle and aunt effects, suggesting the influence through uncles and aunts as an important channel
for the grandparent effects. At last but not least, we claim that three-generational social mobility
is not sensitive to the shock on the second generation’s education.
Chapter 3 (joint with Elizabeth Hoffman) is purely theoretical. Warm glow and pure altruism
are two widely used ways to model parental love in the literature. The two methods seem to be the
same essentially since they share some important attributes. For example, parents will sacrifice part
of their consumption to leave bequests to their children in both cases. Therefore, their differences
have never been explored rigorously before. In this paper, we compare the two methods in the
same backgrounds and explore their differences in the implications for fertility and bequests. We
find that fertility and bequests have dramatically different solution forms in the two cases. More
specifically, fertility has a much more complicated solution form than bequests under warm glow
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preference. Fertility does not have a closed-form solution in this case. On the contrary, fertility
is much simpler than bequests when parents show pure altruism towards their children, although
both have closed-form solutions. Intuitions about the differences between the two similar modeling
methods are discussed. Last, we use an example to show how the results will change after we
replace warm glow in the paper with pure altruism.
Chapter 4 introduces behavioral economics into family economics. Exponential discounting is
a widely accepted assumption in mainstream economics. Hyperbolic discounting, which presents
different attributes from exponential discounting, receives evidence from the lab and field and
therefore is applied to many branches of economics. In this paper, I investigate the effects of
hyperbolic discounting on demographic economics where parental love is modeled by pure altruism.
I find that hyperbolic discounting will reduce fertility and increase educational investments in both
the commitment problem and time-consistent problem. The magnitude of the changes in fertility
and educational investments in the time-consistent problem is bigger than that in the commitment
problem. Intuitions about the differences are discussed.
From the discussion above, we can see that this dissertation delves into the interactions among
members who belong to different generations. One important reason is that I have strong interests
in the long-run inequality of education and fertility of a society.
3
CHAPTER 2. SOCIAL MOBILITY ACROSS THREE GENERATIONS:
EVIDENCE FROM CHINA
Jia Cao and Minghao Li
2.1 Introduction
The majority of the literature on social mobility focuses on two adjacent generations, namely,
the correlation between parents and children [Becker and Tomes (1979); Becker et al. (2018)].
One implicit assumption of such research is that the dynamics of social mobility can be modeled
by a first-order autoregressive [AR(1)] process. Within this framework, the influence of the first
generation’s social status (such as income and education) on their descendants will decline geo-
metrically across the future generations. Consequently, grandparents will have no direct effects on
their grandchildren; the only grandparent effect is indirect and mediated through the parents.
However, there are plausible reasons that the AR(1) assumption is not valid. First, genetic
information from the grandparents may be repressed in parents and manifested again in children.
Second, grandparents may also exert direct economical, educational, and cultural influence on
the children. The effects are especially relevant for certain demographic groups in countries that
have closely-tied extended families. If these direct grandparent effects do exist, the results of
two-generation studies under AR(1) assumption cannot be extended to multiple generations.
Several papers provide empirical evidence showing the existence of higher-order autoregressive
processes (i.e. direct grandparent effects). However, due to data availability, most of the research
is on developed countries, especially Scandinavian countries [Lindahl et al. (2015); Møllegaard and
Jæger (2015)]. Research on multigenerational social mobility in developing countries is limited.
The multigenerational social mobility in China is of special importance for this literature. First,
China is the world’s largest developing country and the evidence from China is indispensable in the
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debate on grandparent effects. Second, China’s historical and institutional backgrounds provide
unique opportunities to understand the mechanisms of multigenerational social mobility. However,
despite the importance of this topic, there is a dearth of multigenerational mobility research on
China. To our best knowledge, the only available research is by Zeng and Xie (2014), which
uses a relatively small rural sample with incomplete educational attainment information for the
grandchildren generation.
This paper is the first to study social mobility across three generations in China using a large,
nationally representative sample. Data used in this study is from multiple waves (2011, 2013, 2014,
2015) of the China Health and Retirement Survey. We combined all waves of the survey to create
a comprehensive dataset with rich information on the three generations.
The explicit grandparent effects are more likely to happen in China than in Western countries
because, traditionally, big families with multiple generations living together are considered more
successful than small families with only two generations. Although small families are pretty common
at present, it is still a usual practice for the grandparents to take care of the children when the
parents are busy with work. Grandparents usually consider it as a kind of pleasure instead of a
burden to take care of their grandchildren. Using nationally representative datasets, this paper
measures three-generational social mobility directly in China for the first time.
We find strong and positive direct grandparent effects. Besides contributing to the long-debated
grandparent effects, this study sheds light on possible mechanisms that such effects take place. We
also find significantly positive uncle and aunt effects from both paternal and maternal sides. Previ-
ous studies often overlook uncle/aunt effects due to data limitations. The inclusion of uncle/aunt
effects reduces grandparent effects, suggesting the influence through uncles and aunts as an impor-
tant channel for the grandparent effects. Last but not least, we attempt to quantify the grandparent
effects through parents’ formal education. In China, the education of some cohorts in the parent
generation was reduced by the Cultural Revolution. Exploiting this unique historical background,
we find that parents’ education has a causal and positive relationship with children’s education.
Surprisingly, three-generational social mobility is not sensitive to the shocks on parents’ education.
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Our paper can contribute to the debate about grandparent effects in mobility research: are
grandparent effects on grandchildren entirely mediated through parents, or do grandparents have
independent and direct effects through other channels? Previous literature has provided various
methods, which can serve as the departure point of this study, to answer these questions empirically,
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a literature review on the empirical
studies about multigenerational social mobility. Section 2.3 presents the theoretical framework
of intergenerational mobility. Section 2.4 describes the data we use. Section 2.5 summarizes the
empirical results. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
Most of the existing multigenerational mobility studies are conducted in developed countries due
to data availability. Most of them find no significant grandparent effect when parents’ effects are
controlled. In an early study in the U.S., Hodge (1966) finds that besides the indirect effects through
parents, the occupation of grandparents has no direct effect on the occupation of the children. This
conclusion is echoed in later years. For example, using data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study,
Warren and Hauser (1997) find that grandparents’ social status has no statistically significant
impact on children’s social status once parents’ social status is controlled. Using a sample of
twins, Behrman and Taubman (1985) find that grandparents’ schooling has no significant effect on
children’s schooling. Erola and Moisio (2007) construct 57,585 three-generation lineages in Finland
from 1950-2000 and find that the grandchildren’s social class is almost conditionally independent
from the grandparents’ social class after parents’ social class is controlled. Lucas and Kerr (2013)
and Peters (1992) also find no significant grandparent effect.
However, there are still studies finding statistically significant grandparent effects with the data
sets of Western countries. Chan and Boliver (2013) use data from three British birth cohort stud-
ies and find a statistically significant grandparent effect on their grandchildren’s relative mobility
patterns, after parents’ social class is controlled. Lindahl et al. (2015) find strong evidence that
grandparents’ education and income directly affect children’s income in a Swedish four-generation
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study. Interestingly, Chan and Boliver (2014) argue that the main conclusion of “almost condi-
tional independence” from Erola and Moisio (2007) is not supported by the results in the article.
They demonstrate that the grandparent effect in social mobility in Finland is not only statistically
significant, but is also of substantial importance.
Researchers also try to identify the possible mechanism of the grandparent effects. Møllegaard
and Jæger (2015) analyze data from Denmark. They find that it is grandparents’ cultural capital,
instead of economic and social capital that plays a positive role when grandchildren choose the
academic track in upper secondary education. The results of Møllegaard and Jæger (2015) show
that the possible mechanism for the grandparent effects on grandchildren’s education success is
carried out through the transmission of non-economic resources. The results, as the authors suggest,
may be valid only in wealthy societies such as Scandinavian countries.
For the case of China, most empirical studies on multigenerational mobility focus on specific
groups. Mare and Song (2014) investigate two datasets: one is genealogical data from the Qing
Dynasty Imperial Lineage which contains 12 generations of Qing emperors and their relatives from
the 17th to the 20th centuries; the other is population registry data which contains 10 generations
of male peasants in the northeastern province of Liaoning from the mid-18th to the early 20th
centuries. The former dataset contains individuals at the top while the latter contains individuals
at the bottom of the society. Despite the huge differences between the two datasets, both find
that men’s social positions are affected not only by the positions of their fathers but also of their
grandfathers and great-grandfathers.
Shiue (2016) uses data covering information on seven lineages of nearly 10,000 men to explore
social mobility. The author finds that educational inequality is closely related to changes in mobility
over time. As for the grandparent effects, this paper also finds that the lineal impact of grandfathers
and older generations is overshadowed by non-lineal interactions coming from higher status men in
the same generation as the father. The results are consistent with the historical phenomenon that
extended family members usually lived together and had strong communal ties among each other
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in history. Note that all of the individuals in Shiue’s data lived in one county of Anhui province,
located in south of China.
Zeng and Xie (2014) is the only multigenerational mobility study for modern China with a
relatively large sample. They used data from the 2002 Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP)
to study the effect of grandparents’ education on children’s education in rural China. Because the
third generation in the data was still in school, the authors could only observe the final educa-
tion outcome for those students who dropped out. They have to use logit models to estimate the
probabilities of dropping out from schools. Consequently, the authors use only rural data, because
dropout rates are very low in urban China. Nonetheless, they not only find a significant grand-
parent effect after controlling for parents’ education and social status, but they also show that the
effect exists only if the grandparents live with the children. That means the direct grandparent
effect is less likely to work through genetic inheritance, and more likely to work through personal
interactions. It also means the intensity of the interaction matters, since living non co-resident
grandparents (who presumably also have a certain level of interaction with the children) have no
effect on grandchildren’s education.
2.3 The Model
2.3.1 The Case of AR(1) Process
The model here follows Solon (2014) with one revision. Family i contains one parent born at
time t−1 and one child born at time t. The parent’s income yi,t−1 is used for her own consumption
Ci,t−1 and investment Ii,t−1 in the child’s education. The budget constraint is
yi,t−1 = Ci,t−1 + Ii,t−1 (2.1)
The child’s schooling Si,t is a function of education investment Ii,t−1 and endowment from the
parent ei,t
Sit = θlogIi,t−1 + eit (2.2)
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where θ is assumed to be positive.
In Solon (2014), the equation above describes the formation of human capital. I change it into
schooling because schooling can be measured more accurately than human capital. This is the only
revision I made. The endowment follows an AR(1) process
eit = δ + λei,t−1 + vit (2.3)
where vit is an error term which is not correlated with endowment and 0 < λ < 1.
The child’s income is a function of her schooling
logyit = u+ pSit (2.4)
where p is assumed to be positive.
The parent’s utility function is
Ui = (1− α)logCi,t−1 + αlogyit (2.5)
α is the altruism parameter because the parent cares about her child’s welfare which is repre-
sented by a function of the child’s income.
Solving the problem, we have
Sit = Ω1 + (λ+ θp)Si,t−1 − λθpSi,t−2 + vit (2.6)
where Ω1 = δ + (1− λ)θ
[
u+ αp1−α(1−θp)
]
. The proof will be given in the Appendix.
We can see that 0 < λθp < λ + θp from the assumptions of the three parameters. If the
assumption of AR(1) process is true, the model predicts a negative coefficient of grandparental
schooling and the magnitude of the coefficient is smaller than that of the parental schooling. The
prediction of negative sign seems counter-intuitive at the first glance. It is easy to understand the
prediction if we know that the influence of grandparental schooling is calculated after the influence
of parental schooling is controlled. It is illustrated in figure 2.1. Suppose children A and B’s
parents have the same schooling. However, A’s grandparent has more schooling than B’s. More
schooling implies higher income, and higher income implies more investment. We can infer that A’s
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parent probably has lower endowment (i.e. inherited socially productive traits) because with more
investment in her education, she achieved the same schooling as B’s parent. Since A only gets her
endowment from her parent, the model will predict that she probably has a lower endowment than
B, hence less schooling.
Grandparents Parents Children
Education
A
BG
AG
B
AP = BP
Figure 2.1 Education Comparison of A and B Families
2.3.2 The Case of AR(2) Process
We can model the possibility of grandparent effects with an AR(2) process of the endowments
eit = δ + λ1ei,t−1 + λ2ei,t−2 + vit (2.7)
where λ2 represents grandparent effects. When it equals zero, it degrades to an AR(1) process.
Solving the same problem as the case of AR(1) process, we have the following equation
Sit = Ω2 + (λ1 + θp)Si,t−1 + (λ2 − λ1θp)Si,t−2 − λ2θpSi,t−3 + vit (2.8)
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where Ω2 = δ + (1− λ1 − λ2)θ
[
u+ log αp1−α(1−θp)
]
. The proof will be given in the Appendix.
The sign of the coefficient of grandparental schooling is uncertain. However, if empirical evidence
shows a positive coefficient of grandparental schooling, we can conclude that AR(2) process is a
better assumption than AR(1) process about the dynamics of the endowments since λ2 − λ1θp >
0⇒ λ2 > 0.
2.4 The Data
Data used in this study are from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS).
It is a nationally panel survey targeting the middle-aged and senior populations carried out from
2011. The following three waves of data were collected in 2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively. In this
paper, we combined all waves of the survey to create a comprehensive dataset with rich information
on the three generations. In the survey, a household with at least one member 45 years old or above
is randomly selected, and this member becomes the main respondent. Information is collected on
main respondents and their spouses, together with the parents on both sides and all children of the
couple regardless of where they live. Information on other family members, such as the grandchil-
dren of the main respondents, are available if they live together with the main respondents. In the
first wave of data collected in 2011 and 2012, 17708 individuals who are from 10257 households and
150 counties successfully responded to the survey. This random sample is large enough to represent
the whole aged population. This dataset contains detailed educational attainment information for
three generations regardless of whether they live together and the fourth generation if they live in
the same household. Using the information on the first three generations, nationally representative
three-generation mobility can be measured for the first time for China.
Income and occupation are also used in the literature to represent social status in the research on
social mobility. It may not be a problem in developed countries where income increases slowly and
occupation seldom changes. However, it can be a serious problem in developing countries. China has
experienced rapid economic growth for the previous four decades, when both individuals’ incomes
and occupations changed frequently. Another issue on income is that Chinese like to make money
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in their leisure time. The informal income is quite unpredictable and suffers huge measurement
errors. Education level is the variable which can be measured much more accurately than income
level and occupation in China. Shiue (2016) also finds that educational inequality is closely related
to changes in mobility over time. So, we choose educational attainment to represent social status
for our research.
Table 2.1 Sample Characteristics
Variables Observations Mean Standard errors Min Max
Child’s Schooling 20,237 8.58 4.33 0 22
Child’s Age 20,237 34.18 9.32 10 72
Child’s Gender(Boy=0, Girl=1) 20,237 0.48 0.50 0 1
Area Type(Rural=0, Urban=1) 20,237 0.33 0.47 0 1
Father’s Age 20,237 63.20 10.12 35 94
Mother’s Age 20,237 60.93 9.77 32 93
Father’s Schooling 20,237 7.06 3.55 0 22
Mother’s Schooling 20,237 4.57 3.97 0 22
Paternal Grandfather’s Schooling 20,237 2.27 3.30 0 16
Paternal Grandmother’s Schooling 20,237 0.50 1.75 0 22
Maternal Grandfather’s Schooling 20,237 2.32 3.38 0 16
Maternal Grandmother’s Schooling 20,237 0.53 1.81 0 22
As can be seen from the Table 2.1, the average age of the third generation is 34, which means
that most of them have finished school. We dropped the small sample when grandchildren are still in
school. So, we can use schooling directly instead of estimating the probabilities of dropouts like Zeng
and Xie (2014). The observations of paternal grandparents are less than maternal grandparents.
The possible reason is that there are more mother respondents than father respondents and that
mothers are not able to answer the schooling of their parents-in-law if their husbands are not alive.
Our sample is also larger and more representative. It contains more than 20,000 observations from
the whole country. Zeng and Xie (2014) ’s sample contains only rural data and has only 833
households with the information of three generations.
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2.5 Empirical Analysis
2.5.1 Basic Regression Equation
As illustrated in Section 3, our basic regression equation is
Sc = α+ β1Sf + β2Sm + β3Spf + β4Spm + β5Smf + β6Smm + γX + ε (2.9)
Sc is the schooling of the child. Sf and Sm are the schooling of the child’s father and mother.
Spf and Spm are the schooling of the child’s paternal grandfather and grandmother. Smf and
Smm are the schooling of the child’s maternal grandfather and grandmother. X contains control
variables which are the area type, province, parents’ ages, child’s age and gender.
2.5.2 Basic Regression Results
The regression results are shown in table 2.2. In order to save space, province effects are not
shown in the following regression results.
Table 2.2 Basic Regression Results
Coefficient Standard Errors p-value
Constant 7.243∗∗∗ 0.238 0.000
Age -0.066∗∗∗ 0.006 0.000
Girl -0.670∗∗∗ 0.052 0.000
Urban 1.452∗∗∗ 0.058 0.000
Father’s Age -0.001 0.007 0.869
Mother’s Age 0.001 0.008 0.882
Father’ Schooling 0.285∗∗∗ 0.008 0.000
Mother’ Schooling 0.203∗∗∗ 0.008 0.000
Paternal Grandfather’s Schooling 0.064∗∗∗ 0.009 0.000
Paternal Grandmother’s Schooling 0.025 0.016 0.127
Maternal Grandfather’s Schooling 0.065∗∗∗ 0.008 0.000
Maternal Grandmother’s Schooling 0.026 0.016 0.105
Observations 20,237
Adjusted R-squared 0.268
We can see that both paternal and maternal grandparents’ schooling have positive effects on
children’s schooling. Paternal grandfather effects and maternal grandfather effects are significant
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and have the same magnitude. Grandmother effects are not significant. The possible reason is that
only a small portion of grandmothers received very limited formal education. The negative sign of
the girl dummy variable shows that girls receive less schooling than boys. The positive sign of the
urban dummy variable indicates that children in urban areas stay longer in school than children
from rural areas. The negative sign of age tells us that educational levels increases with time.
2.5.3 Uncle and Aunt Effects
The One Child Policy in China was introduced in 1979, long after the majority of fathers and
mothers in our dataset were born. In fact, fathers have an average of 3.71 siblings, while mothers
have 3.86 siblings. So, we also explore uncle and aunt effects, which were often neglected in previous
research due to data limitations.
Four models are used to explore uncle and aunt effects. In model 1, we use the highest education
of parents’ siblings. We can see that uncle effects are stronger than aunt effects. On the paternal
side, uncle effects are 34% higher than aunt effects. On the maternal side, the gap increases to
49%. If we ignore the gender and estimate the effects of the highest education of parents’ siblings,
the magnitudes are similar on both sides. The results are shown in Table 2.3. In models 3 and 4,
we use the average education of parents’ siblings to test uncle and aunt effects. The results follow
similar patterns.
The regression results also show that grandfather effects decline after the inclusion of uncle
and aunt effects. The results suggest that the influence through uncles and aunts is an important
channel for the grandparent effects. Grandmother effects are still not significant.
Why are uncle effects so much stronger than aunt effects on both paternal and maternal sides?
Do both uncles and aunts show same-gender preferences: do uncles prefer nephews and aunts prefer
nieces? In order to solve these puzzles, we will do regressions for male and female grandchildren
separately.
14
Table 2.3 Regression Results with Uncle and Aunt Effects
Basic Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
The Highest Schooling of Father’s Brothers 0.087∗∗∗
The Highest Schooling of Father’s Sisters 0.065∗∗∗
The Highest Schooling of Mother’s Brothers 0.106∗∗∗
The Highest Schooling of Mother’s Sisters 0.071∗∗∗
The Highest Schooling of Father’s Siblings 0.104∗∗∗
The Highest Schooling of Mother’s Siblings 0.127∗∗∗
The Average Schooling of Father’s Brothers 0.097∗∗∗
The Average Schooling of Father’s Sisters 0.072∗∗∗
The Average Schooling of Mother’s Brothers 0.120∗∗∗
The Average Schooling of Mother’s Sisters 0.074∗∗∗
The Average Schooling of Father’s Siblings 0.169∗∗∗
The Average Schooling of Mother’s Siblings 0.194∗∗∗
Father’s Schooling 0.284∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗
Mother’s Schooling 0.185∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
Paternal Grandfather’s Schooling 0.085∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
Paternal Grandmother’s Schooling 0.016 -0.007 0.001 -0.017 -0.020
Maternal Grandfather’s Schooling 0.073∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
Maternal Grandmother’s Schooling -0.001 -0.015 -0.010 -0.023 -0.029
Observations 9,263 9,263 9,263 9,263 9,263
Adjusted R-squared 0.266 0.294 0.290 0.293 0.291
Whether we use the highest or the average schooling, we find strong evidence for same-gender
preferences from uncles towards their nephews. However, the regression results above do not show
that aunts have same-gender preferences towards their nieces.
2.5.4 Exogenous Shock
During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), some schools were closed for more than one month.
The Cultural Revolution affect a cohort of parents when they were in school. We use this event
as an exogenous shock on the parents’ education. We focus on the father’s education at present
and regress it on the dummy variable whether the father’s school was closed during the Cultural
Revolution. Control variables include father’s age, area type, province and paternal grandparents’
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Table 2.4 Regression Results to Explore Same-Gender Preferences
Male Grandchildren Female Grandchildren
The Highest Schooling of Father’s Brothers 0.084∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
The Highest Schooling of Father’s Sisters 0.039∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
The Highest Schooling of Mother’s Brothers 0.103∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
The Highest Schooling of Mother’s Sisters 0.067∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
The Average Schooling of Father’s Brothers 0.105∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
The Average Schooling of Father’s Sisters 0.039∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
The Average Schooling of Mother’s Brothers 0.111∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
The Average Schooling of Mother’s Sisters 0.071∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
education. The regression results are shown as following. We can see that the exogenous shock has
a negative and significant effect on father’s education.
Table 2.5 Regression Results of Father’s on Dummy Variable
Coefficient Standard Errors p-value
Constant 14.291∗∗∗ 1.295 0.000
Age -0.061∗∗∗ 0.012 0.000
Urban 0.526∗∗∗ 0.082 0.000
Grandfather’s Schooling 0.065∗∗∗ 0.012 0.000
Grandmother’s Schooling 0.076∗∗∗ 0.023 0.001
School Close -0.474∗∗∗ 0.083 0.000
Observations 4,679
Adjusted R-squared 0.088
Now we use the exogenous shock as an instrument variable for father’s education and estimate
the causal effect of father’s education on children’s education. The regression results are given in
Table 2.6.
At last, we use the exogenous shock to explore the three-generational social mobility. The
regression equation can be expressed as
Sc = α+ β1Close+ β2Spg + β3Close ∗ Spg + γX + ε
where Close is the dummy variable indicating father’s school was closed. Spg is the sum and
paternal grandfather and mother’s schooling. We add them up because both will influence father’s
schooling. Control variables include child’s age and gender, mother’s age and schooling, area type,
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Table 2.6 IV Regression Results of Father’s Schooling on Child’s Schooling
Coefficient Standard Errors p-value
Constant 1.032 3.989 0.796
Child’s Age -0.089∗∗∗ 0.017 0.000
Girl -0.392∗∗∗ 0.136 0.004
Urban 1.304∗∗∗ 0.184 0.000
Father’s Schooling 1.378∗∗∗ 0.308 0.000
Mother’s Schooling 0.010 0.050 0.847
Father’s Age 0.041 0.037 0.260
Mother’s Age -0.043 0.027 0.111
Observations 4,434
province and maternal grandparents’ schooling. Control variables don’t include father’s age and
schooling in that they are highly correlated with the dummy variable. Regression results are given
in Table 2.7. The results show that the interactive term is not significant.
Table 2.7 Regression Results of Shock on Multigenerational Social Mobility
Coefficient Standard Errors p-value
Constant 14.511∗∗∗ 1.786 0.000
Child’s Age -0.112∗∗∗ 0.015 0.000
Girl -0.402∗∗∗ 0.117 0.001
Urban 1.664∗∗∗ 0.135 0.000
Mother’s Schooling 0.188∗∗∗ 0.016 0.000
Mother’s Age 0.006 0.017 0.720
Maternal Grandparents’ Schooling 0.057∗∗∗ 0.013 0.000
Close -0.705∗∗∗ 0.156 0.000
Paternal Grandparents’ Schooling 0.031∗∗∗ 0.050 0.538
Close*Paternal Grandparents’ Schooling 0.029 0.029 0.311
Observations 4,434
2.5.5 Robustness
The method requires three regressions. First, we regress the dad’s schooling on the paternal
grandparents’ schooling and get a coefficient β1. Then, we regress the grandson’s schooling on
the dad’s schooling and get another coefficient β2. At last, we regress the grandson’s schooling
on the paternal grandparents’ schooling and get coefficient β3. If grandparent effects do not exist,
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β3 should be close to the product of β1 and β2. We constrain our sample with positive paternal
grandparents’ schooling and grandsons who have finished their educations. Our regression results
shows that
β3 = 0.153 >> 0.151 ∗ 0.374 = β1β2
which suggests that a (paternal) grandparent effect exists.
Table 2.8 Regression Results of the Dad’s Schooling on the Paternal Grandparents’ School-
ing
Coefficient Standard Errors p-value
Constant 12.97∗∗∗ 0.136 0.000
Dad’s Age -0.107∗∗∗ 0.002 0.000
Urban 1.183∗∗∗ 0.045 0.000
Paternal Grandparents’ Schooling 0.151∗∗∗ 0.005 0.000
Observations 23,917
Adjusted R-squared 0.179
Table 2.9 Regression Results of the Grandson’s Schooling on the Dad’s Schooling
Coefficient Standard Errors p-value
Constant 8.402∗∗∗ 0.157 0.000
Urban 2.515∗∗∗ 0.072 0.000
Grandson’s Age -0.110∗∗∗ 0.003 0.000
Dad’s Schooling 0.374∗∗∗ 0.009 0.000
Observations 13,151
Adjusted R-squared 0.293
Table 2.10 Regression Results of the Grandson’s Schooling on the Paternal Grandparents’
Schooling
Coefficient Standard Errors p-value
Constant 11.533∗∗∗ 0.154 0.000
Child’s Age -0.139∗∗∗ 0.004 0.000
Urban 2.816∗∗∗ 0.083 0.000
Paternal Grandparents’ Schooling 0.153∗∗∗ 0.009 0.000
Observations 10,757
Adjusted R-squared 0.212
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2.6 Conclusions
Social mobility is a topic which has been discussed heatedly, both in academia and in public,
for a long time. Most of the previous research on social mobility focuses on two generations due
to data availability. Multigenerational social mobility has gained increasing attention during the
last decade. However, most datasets are limited to developed countries, especially Scandinavian
countries. Research on multigenerational social mobility in developing countries is rare. Using
years of schooling as the main social status indicator, we use a large and nationally representative
dataset to estimate three-generational social mobility in China for the first time.
We have several findings. The first finding is that independent grandparent effects are positive
with statistically significance. The magnitude of grandparent effects are about 20%-25% of parent
effects. This finding contributes to the current literature on multigenerational social mobility with
a better dataset. The second finding is that paternal grandparent effects are stronger than maternal
grandparent effects. We also show that uncle and aunt effects are positive and grandparent effects
decline dramatically after the inclusion of uncle and aunt effects. Last, we use uncle and aunt
effects to explore the topic of same-gender preferences and find that both paternal and maternal
aunts show stronger preferences for same-gender nieces than nephews.
The positive grandparent effects imply that second-order autoregressive processes can model the
dynamics of endowments better than first-order autoregressive processes. But is the second-order
autoregressive process the true model? It depends on the existence of great-grandparent effects
which needs an analysis of four-generation social mobility. This will be future work.
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CHAPTER 3. MODELING PARENTAL LOVE: WARM GLOW OR PURE
ALTRUISM?
Jia Cao and Elizabeth Hoffman
3.1 Introduction
Self-interest is the main driving force of human behavior, but it is not the only one. Altruism is
widely observed, and thus commonly modeled in many fields including economics [Becker (1976);
Simon (1993); Fehr and Schmidt (2006)]. Parental love is probably the kind of altruism to which
people pay the most attention. Two kinds of methods are usually used to model parental love in
the literature. One kind is called pure altruism. A behavior is motivated by pure altruism if its
only motive is to improve the welfare of others. In the literature of modeling parental love, pure
altruism implies that parents care about the lifetime utility of their children [Becker (1974); Becker
(1976); Becker and Barro (1986)]. The implication of pure altruism in Becker’s model is that the
higher the children’s lifetime utility is, the higher their parents’ utility will be. The alternative
method used to model parental love is warm glow. An agent with warm glow preferences receives
utility from the behavior of giving, instead of the welfare impact on receivers. Although giving
will probably improve the welfare of others, the giver does not care about the consequences of her
giving. The mixture of pure altruism and warm glow is called impure altruism which is originally
proposed to explain charity and public donations [Andreoni (1989, 1990)].
The mechanisms of warm glow and pure altruism in modeling parental love are illustrated in
Figure 3.1. In the case of warm glow, parents give bequests to their children. The more bequests
the parents leave, the happier they will feel. In the case of pure altruism, parents also give bequests
to their children, and the purpose of leaving bequests is to improve the children’s welfare. The
higher the children’s lifetime welfare is, the happier the parents will feel. The same thing between
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warm glow and pure altruism in modeling parental love is that parents will leave bequests to their
children in both cases. The only difference is that the parents with warm glow preferences care
about how many bequests to leave, while the parents with pure altruism care about the positive
effect of the bequests on their children’s welfare.
The difference between warm glow and pure altruism seems not essential since the parents
have the same behavior, leaving bequests to their children, in both cases. Also, warm glow is much
easier to handle than pure altruism since the children’s utility will not appear in warm glow models.
Consequently, warm glow is usually considered as a proxy of pure altruism to model parental love.
The purpose of this paper, however, is to explore whether the difference between warm glow and
pure altruism in modeling parental love is essential or not. The only difference between the parents
with warm glow and pure altruism is in motivation, that is to say, parents love their children from
the perspective of their children or themselves. The difference in motivation seems to be subtle
and is always ignored in the literature. We want to explore whether the differences are subtle
enough to be ignored. As a result, we think it necessary to compare warm glow and pure altruism
systematically and comprehensively in the literature of modeling parental love. As far as we know,
our paper is the first to fill in this gap.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 shows more related literature. Section 3.3
presents the model in detail. We first consider the cases of warm glow and pure altruism in a
general way, which means that the models will not contain specific forms of utility function and
altruism parameters, then we consider the two cases with specific functions to solve the models
completely. Section 3.4 uses an example to show the differences of the two kinds of modeling
methods. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
The theory of warm glow is firstly proposed by Andreoni (1989) to explain charitable giving.
Andreoni (1990) extends the warm glow theory to the literature on public donations. In the two
seminal papers, impure altruism is created to mean the mixture of pure altruism and warm glow.
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Figure 3.1 Warm Glow and Pure Altruism in Modeling Parental Love
The theory of altruism has a long history. In economics, pure altruism is introduced by Becker
(1974) to model parental love.
The different implications of warm glow and pure altruism for charity giving and public goods
donations are studied both theoretically and empirically [Andreoni (1989, 1990); Harbaugh et al.
(2007); Ottoni-Wilhelm et al. (2017)]. If warm glow plays no role in donating to public goods,
namely pure altruism is the only motivation to donate, the neutrality hypothesis which states that
charity is subject to complete crowding out should be valid. However, the neutrality hypothesis
is rejected empirically, and the crowd-out effect is found to decrease with output [Ottoni-Wilhelm
et al. (2017)]. Crumpler and Grossman (2008) also uses an experimental method to show the
existence of warm glow in charity giving. In other words, donations are probably motivated by
both warm glow and pure altruism, although pure altruism is the dominating motive.
Different implications for the pro-environmental behavior of pure and impure altruism are also
noticed. Hartmann et al. (2008) use two online surveys to show that warm glow has a stronger
influence on pro-environmental intentions than pure altruism. One possible explanation for the
different importance of warm glow and pure altruism in donation and pro-environmental behaviors
is that donations can improve other people’s welfare directly, while pro-environmental behavior can
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only improve other people’s welfare indirectly. Pure altruism should be strong when we can easily
see the improvement of others from our behaviors easily.
In the literature on modeling parental love, however, implications of the two modeling methods
have not been studied before. Usually one kind of the two methods is assumed to represent parental
love without comparison to the other kind. Warm glow is used more often due to its relatively
simple tractability. For example, in the literature of fertility under hyperbolic discounting, warm
glow preferences is adopted to represent parental love [Wrede (2011); Wigniolle (2013)](Wrede,
2011; Wigniolle, 2013). In macroeconomics, Galor and Zeira (1993) uses warm glow as parental
love to explore the role of wealth distribution through investment in human capital. In Section 3.5,
we will use this paper as an example to show the differences between warm glow and pure altruism.
3.3 The Model
Every individual is assumed to live two periods: youth and adulthood. Bequests and fertility
decisions are made in adulthood. Consistent with Becker (1974), we assume that an individual will
have children without marriage. A family, therefore, consists of one parent and her children. The
number of children is also allowed to be continuous. Wages in two periods are taken as given. A
perfect financial market is available. Agents can save and borrow as much as they want at the same
interest rates. Bequest taxes are paid by the parent.
3.3.1 The Case of Warm Glow
An agent tries to maximize
U = u(c1) + δu(c2) + δΦ(n)u(b
′)
subject to
(1− τ1)w1 + b+
(1− τ2)w2(1− nx) + ns− nb′/(1− τ)
R
= c1 +
c2
R
where τ, τ1, τ2 are the tax rates on bequests and wages in period one and two, respectively.
Taxes are introduced to explore the different effects of warm glow and pure altruism on bequests
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and fertility. If the parent wants each of her children to receive a bequest b′ , the parent needs
to leave total bequests of nb′/(1 − τ). The only cost of raising children is time. One child needs
x percentage of the parent’s total time. s is the subsidy for one child. δ is the time discounting
rate and R is the interest rate. The altruism parameter is Φ(n) which is the same as the case of
pure altruism. In order to compare warm glow and pure altruism, we need to keep the remaining
settings the same. Moreover, without altruism parameter, the only benefit of having children is the
subsidy. This is not a reasonable case. The parent gains utility from giving bequests.
Let λ1 be the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint. FOCs are
c1 : u
′(c1) = λ1 (3.1)
c2 : δu
′(c2) =
λ1
R
(3.2)
n : δΦ′(n)u(b′) = λ1
(
(1− τ2)w2x− s+ b′/(1− τ)
R
)
(3.3)
b′ : δΦ(n)u′(b′) =
λ1n
R(1− τ)
(3.4)
We need some assumptions before going on.
Assumption 1. The functions u(·) and Φ(·) show constant elasticities of substitution. Specifically,
ε(u) ≡ cu
′(c)
u(c) = 1− γ, ε(Φ) ≡
nΦ′(n)
Φ(n) = 1− ε. Moreover, 0 < τ, τ1, τ2, γ, ε < 1.
Generally speaking, this assumption states that tax rates, the elasticities of consumption and
altruism function are positive but less than one.
Assumption 2. 1− ε > 1− γ.
This assumption states that the elasticity of the altruism function is greater than the elasticity
of the utility function. As we will see shortly, this assumption is needed to guarantee positive
bequests.
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Assumption 3. (1− τ2)w2x > s.
This assumption states that the costs of raising children should be greater than the subsidies.
Without this assumption, there will be corner solutions for fertility since agents will spend all the
time having children instead of working. In fact, fertility will be 1x if this assumption is violated, a
trivial situation.
Combining (3) and (4), we have
Φ′(n)u(b′)
Φ(n)u′(b′)
=
(1− τ2)(1− τ)w2x− (1− τ)s+ b′
n
We can rewrite it as(
nΦ′(n)
Φ(n)
)(
u(b′)
b′u′(b′)
)
=
1− ε
1− γ
=
(1− τ2)(1− τ)w2x− (1− τ)s+ b′
b′
Rearranging the equation above, we have the solution for the bequest.
Proposition 1. Bequest under warm glow preferences can be determined by
b′wg = (1− τ)
1− γ
γ − ε
[(1− τ2)w2x− s] (3.5)
Assumptions 1-3 guarantee that the bequest above is positive. Several corollaries arise from
Proposition 1.
Corollary 1. Under warm glow preferences, the bequests given are independent of both the bequests
received and wages in the first period.
Corollary 1 shows that bequests lack persistence and thus do not have accumulative effects across
generations. Under warm glow preferences, bequest giving is similar to consumption, but with an
altruism multiplier which is an increasing function of fertility. As will be shown in Corollary 3, an
agent with more bequests and higher wages in the first period will choose to have more children,
rather than to leave a higher bequest to each child, to improve her lifetime welfare.
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Corollary 2. The optimal bequests under warm glow preferences are a function of 7 variables and
parameters. The effects of these variables and parameters on the bequests are shown as follows
where “+” represents positive effects and “−” represents negative effects.
b′wg = b
(
γ
(−)
, ε
(+)
, τ
(−)
, τ2
(−)
, w2
(+)
, s
(−)
, x
(+)
)
We can have the following implications from Corollary 2. First, the bequests are positively
related to the elasticity of the utility function, which is 1−γ, and negatively related to the elasticity
of altruism function which is 1−ε. A higher elasticity of the utility function implies higher marginal
utility of consumption, and thus a higher level of optimal consumption. Therefore, the optimal
bequests will be high when the elasticity of the utility function is high, since bequests play a role
similar to that of consumption. Similarly, a higher elasticity of altruism function implies higher
fertility, which is preferred to higher bequests.
Second, wages in the second period are positively related to bequests. Higher wages in the
second period imply higher opportunity costs of raising children. So, the substitution effect is neg-
ative. The income effect of higher wages in the second period is positive and will increase fertility.
The total effect on fertility is ambiguous. However, the effect of higher wages in the second period
on bequests is positive all the time. Namely, parents will choose to leave a higher bequest to each
child when they can make more money in the second period. Finally, higher s or lower x means
lower costs of raising children and thus will reduce bequests since fertility will increase.
Now let’s move on to solve for fertility under warm glow preferences. We need specific forms
of utility function and altruism parameters to achieve this goal. Assuming that u(c) = c
1−γ
1−γ and
Φ(n) = αn
1−ε
1−ε , α > 0, we can figure out the solution of fertility in the following steps.
Substituting consumption into the budget constraint, we have
c1 +
c2
R
= (λ1)
− 1
γ
[
1 + (δR)
1
γ R−1
]
= (1− τ1)w1 + b+
(1− τ2)w2(1− nx) + ns− nb′/(1− τ)
R
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⇒ (λ1)−
1
γ = α1
[
(1− τ1)w1 + b+
(1− τ2)w2(1− nx) + ns− nb′/(1− τ)
R
]
(3.6)
where α1 = 1/
[
1 + (δR)
1
γ R−1
]
.
Rewriting (4) we have
(λ1)
− 1
γ =
[
1− ε
(1− τ)αδR
] 1
γ
b′n
ε
γ (3.7)
Combining the two equations above with the solution for bequests, we have the following propo-
sition regarding fertility under warm glow preferences.
Proposition 2. Fertility under warm glow preferences is unique and determined by the following
equation,
(1− τ1)w1R+ bR+ (1− τ2)w2
(1− τ2)w2x− s
− 1− ε
γ − ε
nwg = (1− τ)
1− γ
γ − ε
[
1 + (δR)
− 1
γ R
] [ 1− ε
(1− τ)α
] 1
γ
(nwg)
ε
γ
(3.8)
The left-hand-side is a downward line with a positive intercept. The right-hand-side is an
upward curve from the origin. Therefore, there is a unique solution for optimal fertility. Unlike the
relatively simple expression for optimal bequests, optimal fertility becomes much more complex.
Corollary 3. Fertility under warm glow preferences is determined by 13 variables and parameters.
The effects of these variables and parameters on bequests are shown as follows, where “+” represents
positive effects, “−” represents negative effects, and “?” represents ambiguous effects.
nwg = n
(
γ
(?)
, ε
(?)
, τ
(−)
, τ1
(−)
, w1
(+)
, τ2
(?)
, w2
(?)
, s
(+)
, x
(−)
, α
(+)
, δ
(+)
, R
(+)
, b
(+)
)
Proof. The effect of γ on fertility is ambiguous. However, if δR ≤ 1 and nwg > 1, then ∂nwg∂γ > 0.
This is illustrated in figure 2.
The effect of ε on fertility is also ambiguous. However, if nwg > 1, then
∂nwg
∂ε < 0. This
is because both 1−εγ−ε and
(1−ε)1/γ
γ−ε are increasing functions of ε. When nwg > 1, (nwg)
ε
γ is also
increasing with ε. This is illustrated in figure 2.
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The effects of w2 and τ2 are also ambiguous. But it is easy to see that fertility will be negatively
related to w2 and positively related to τ2 when there is no subsidy.
Other certain signs can be determined by similar methods.
nwg n*wg
LHS LHS*
RHS
RHS*
When gamma increases 
n
Figure 3.2 The Illustration of
∂nwg
∂γ > 0
In steady state where b = b′, we will have the following proposition and corollary.
Proposition 3. Steady-state fertility under warm glow preferences is unique and determined by
the following equation,
(1− τ)1−γγ−εR+
(1−τ1)w1R+(1−τ2)w2
(1−τ2)w2x−s −
1−ε
γ−εnwgss = (1− τ)
1−γ
γ−ε
[
1 + (δR)
− 1
γ R
] [
1−ε
(1−τ)α
] 1
γ
(nwgss)
ε
γ
Corollary 4. Steady-state fertility under warm glow preferences is determined by 12 variables and
parameters,
nwgss = n
(
γ
(?)
, ε
(?)
, τ
(−)
, τ1
(−)
, w1
(+)
, τ2
(?)
, w2
(?)
, s
(+)
, x
(−)
, α
(+)
, δ
(+)
, R
(+)
)
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nwgn*wg
LHS LHS*
RHS
RHS*
When epsilon increases 
n
Figure 3.3 The Illustration of
∂nwg
∂ε < 0
Again, steady-state fertility under warm glow preferences will be negatively related to wages
in the second period if there is no subsidy. However, the effects of γ and ε can not be determined
even if we restrict the optimal fertility to exceed unity.
We can see that in the case of warm glow, bequests have closed-form solutions and do not depend
on the functional forms of the utility function and the altruism parameter. On the contrary, fertility
under warm glow preferences does not have a closed-form solution and depends on the specific forms
of the utility function and the altruism parameter.
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3.3.2 The Case of Pure Altruism
We return to the general case without specific forms of the utility function and the altruism
parameter. The young agent’s value function is
V (b) = max
c1,c2,n,b′
{
u(c1) + δu(c2) + δΦ(n)V (b
′)
}
(3.9)
subject to the same budget constraint with the case of warm glow,
c1 +
c2
R
= (1− τ1)w1 + b+
(1− τ2)w2(1− nx) + ns− nb′/(1− τ)
R
:= I
The same assumptions in the case of warm glows are still needed here. Let λ2 be the Lagrangian
multiplier associated with the budget constraint. Optimal consumption choices satisfy
λ2 = u
′(c1) = δRu
′(c2) (3.10)
The optimal fertility and bequests conditions are
n : λ2
(
(1− τ)w2x− s+ b′/(1− τ)
R
)
= δΦ′(n)V (b′) (3.11)
b′ :
λ2n
R(1− τ)
= δΦ(n)V ′(b′) (3.12)
From the Envelope Theorem we have
V ′(b) = λ2 (3.13)
So in steady states where b = b′, equation (13) and the bequest condition determine fertility
Φ(n)
n
=
1
(1− τ)δR
(3.14)
We can see that fertility under pure altruism depends on the altruism parameter, bequest tax
rate, time discounting factor and interest rate. It is independent of the utility function and of wages
in both periods. We add the same functional forms of u(·) and Φ(·), as in the last section, from
now on.
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Proposition 4. Steady-state fertility under pure altruism can be expressed as,
n =
[
(1− τ)αδR
1− ε
] 1
ε
(3.15)
Corollary 5. Steady-state fertility under pure altruism is determined by five parameters,
npass = n
(
ε
(+)
, τ
(−)
, α
(+)
, δ
(+)
, R
(+)
)
Compared to steady-state fertility under warm glow preferences, we find differences and simi-
larities.
Corollary 6. Wages and the utility function will affect the steady-state fertility under warm glow
preferences but have no influence on the steady-state fertility under pure altruism.
This is the characteristic difference between warm glow and pure altruism with regard to their
implications for fertility. Parents with pure altruism can foresee their children’s lifetime utility
perfectly, which implies steady-state fertility is determined by few fundamental parameters and
renders wages and utility functions irrelevant in determining fertility.
Corollary 7. Steady-state fertility is positively related to interest rates and negatively related to
bequest tax rates in both cases.
This is the characteristic similarity between warm glow and pure altruism in their implications
for fertility. Raising kids is a kind of investment and interest rates are the returns for this kind of
investment. Unsurprisingly, higher interest rates imply higher fertility. With higher bequest tax
rates, parents are discouraged from raising children since the returns of this kind of investment will
decrease.
Now we can move on to solve for bequests under pure altruism.
Substituting equation (10) into (9)
V (b) = max
n,b′
{
α−γ1
I1−γ
1− γ
+ δ
αn1−ε
1− ε
V (b′)
}
= max
c1,n,b′
{
1
α1
c1−γ1
1− γ
+ δ
αn1−ε
1− ε
V (b′)
}
(3.16)
31
Combining (16) with FOCs, we have
b : V ′(b) = c−γ1 (3.17)
b′ : c−γ1
n
R(1− τ)
= δ
αn1−ε
1− ε
V ′(b′) (3.18)
n : c−γ1
(
(1− τ2)w2x− s+ b′/(1− τ)
R
)
= δαn−εV (b′) (3.19)
From (17) and (18) we have
c−γ1 = (1− τ)δR
αn−ε
1− ε
(c
′
1)
−γ (3.20)
From (19) we have
αn1−ε
1−ε V (b
′) = αn
1−ε
1−ε c
−γ
1
(
(1−τ2)w2x−s+b′/(1−τ)
R
)
1
δαn−ε
=
c−γ1
δ(1−ε)
(
(1−τ2)w2x−s+b′/(1−τ)
R n
) (3.21)
Substituting optimal consumption levels into the budget constraint, we have
c1 +
c2
R
=
c1
α1
= (1− τ1)w1 + b+
(1− τ2)w2(1− nx) + ns− nb′/(1− τ)
R
(3.22)
By combining the two equations above, we have
αn1−ε
1− ε
V (b′) =
c−γ1
δ(1− ε)
(
(1− τ1)w1 + b+
(1− τ2)w2
R
− c1
α1
)
(3.23)
From (19) and (20) we also have
V (b) =
(c01)
−γ
δαn−ε
(
(1− τ2)w2x− s+ b′/(1− τ)
R
)
=
(1− τ)R(c1)−γ
1− ε
(
(1− τ2)w2x− s+ b′/(1− τ)
R
)
(3.24)
where the superscript of zero denotes the variables of the agent’s parent. Rearranging the
equation above we have
V (b) =
c−γ1
1− ε
(1− τ)
(
(1− τ2)w2x− s+ b′/(1− τ)
)
(3.25)
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Substituting (23) and (25) into (16), we have
c−γ1
1− ε
(1−τ)
(
(1− τ2)w2x− s+ b′/(1− τ)
)
=
1
α1
c1−γ1
1− γ
+
c−γ1
1− ε
(
(1− τ1)w1 + b+
(1− τ2)w2
R
− c1
α1
)
(3.26)
In equilibrium, we have
c∗1 = α1
1− γ
γ − ε
(
(1− τ) [(1− τ2)w2x− s]− (1− τ1)w1 −
(1− τ2)w2
R
)
(3.27)
Substituting consumption in the first period and fertility into (22), we have bequests in steady
state
bpass =
R
(1− τ)R−
[
(1−τ)αδR
1−ε
] 1
ε
 1−γγ−ε (1− τ) [(1− τ2)w2x− s]
− 1−εγ−ε
[
(1− τ1)w1 + (1−τ2)w2R
]
+ (1−τ2)w2x−sR
[
(1−τ)αδR
1−ε
] 1
ε

Rearranging the variables, we have the following proposition,
Proposition 5. Steady-state bequests under pure altruism can be expressed as,
bpass =
R
(1− τ)R−
[
(1−τ)αδR
1−ε
] 1
ε
 (1− τ2)w2
{
1−γ
γ−ε (1− τ)x−
1−ε
γ−ε
1
R +
x
R
[
(1−τ)αδR
1−ε
] 1
ε
}
− 1−εγ−ε(1− τ1)w1 − s
{
1−γ
γ−ε (1− τ) +
1
R
[
(1−τ)αδR
1−ε
] 1
ε
}

Corollary 8. Steady-state bequests under pure altruism is a function of 12 parameters and vari-
ables,
bpass = b
(
γ
(−)
, ε
(+)
, τ
(−)
, τ1
(+)
, w1
(−)
, τ2
(?)
, w2
(?)
, s
(−)
, x
(+)
, α
(+)
, δ
(+)
, R
(?)
)
Compared to the bequests under warm glow preferences, we find differences and similarities.
Corollary 9. Interest rates and wages in the first period will affect the steady-state bequests under
pure altruism, but will not affect the bequests under warm glow preferences.
This is the difference between warm glow and pure altruism in their implications for bequests.
It should be noted that the bequests given are independent of the bequests received. So the concept
of steady-state bequests do not make sense under warm glow preferences.
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Corollary 10. Bequests under both warm glow and pure altruism are positively related to the
elasticity of the consumption function and the time percentage of raising a child; and are negatively
related to the elasticity of altruism function, bequest tax rates and subsidy.
These are the similarities between warm glow and pure altruism in their implications for be-
quests. A higher elasticity of consumption function implies higher bequests since bequests can
be regarded as consumption in our models. Parents will leave a higher bequest to each child to
compensate for having fewer children due to higher raising costs. On the contrary, parents will also
leave a lower bequest to each child in order to have more children due to the higher elasticity of
altruism function.
3.4 An Example
In this section, we will use an example to show the differences between warm glow and pure
altruism. Specifically, we will use pure altruism to replace warm glow in a model and compare the
new results with the previous ones. The benchmark model is from Galor and Zeira (RES 1993; GZ
hereafter). The GZ model includes two variables, education investment and bequest.
Being consistent with GZ, each individual has one parent and one child. Every individual lives
two periods. It is also assumed that individuals consume only in the second period of life. There
are also two major assumptions in the GZ model.
Assumption 4. Credit markets are imperfect. The interest rates for borrowers, i, are higher than
that for lenders, r.
This assumption is critical to generating the dynamics of bequests in the GZ model, but does
not play such an important role in our revised model with pure altruism, shown later.
Assumption 5. Investment in human capital is indivisible.
The implication of this assumption is that an individual will not invest in education to become
a skilled worker until her wealth reaches some threshold level.
The utility function which is needed to be maximized in GZ is,
34
u = αlnc+ (1− α)lnb
b is the bequest the individual gives to her child. So it is warm glow here that represents the
parent’s love. If we use pure altruism to replace warm glow, the value function we need to maximize
becomes
V (x) = αlnc+ (1− α)V (b)
x is the bequest the individual receives from her own parent. We can consider 1 − α as the
parent’s altruism parameter. The higher the altruism parameter is, the more bequests the parent
will leave to her children.
We have three different cases.
3.4.1 Case One: Unskilled Workers
Unskilled workers will not invest in human capital. They are lenders in the credit market
because they can work in the first period and, by assumption, consumption only happens in the
second period. We use V1 to denote the value function of unskilled workers. Currently, we assume
that the children of unskilled workers will still be unskilled workers. The maximization problem is
max
c,b
V1(x) = αlnc+ (1− α)V1(b)
subject to
I1 = c+ b = (x+ wn)(1 + r) + wn
Substituting the budget constraint into the objective function, the maximization problem be-
comes
max
b
V1(x) = αln(I1 − b) + (1− α)V1(b)
FOCs w.r.t. b and x are
α
I1 − b
= (1− α)V ′1 (b)
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V
′
1 (x) =
α
I1 − b
(1 + r)
Combining the two equations above, we have
V
′
1 (b)
V
′
1 (x)
=
1
(1− α)(1 + r)
Lemma 1. V1(x) is strictly increasing and concave.
Proof. V
′
1 (x) =
α
I1−b(1 + r) > 0, V
′′
1 (x) = − α(I1−b)2 (1 + r)
2 < 0.
Proposition 6. The dynamics of bequests of unskilled workers depend on the interest rates of
lending and the altruism parameter. Specifically speaking,
1. when (1− α)(1 + r) < 1⇒ b < x. Bequests will keep decreasing generation by generation.
2. when (1− α)(1 + r) = 1⇒ b = x. Bequests will not change across generations.
3. when (1− α)(1 + r) > 1⇒ b > x. Bequests will keep increasing generation by generation.
The results are quite different from that in GZ. In GZ for unskilled workers, there exists a
unique low-level steady-state equilibrium when (1 − α)(1 + r) < 1 which is the only situation
discussed. The low-level equilibrium is also locally stable. A small deviation from this equilibrium
will be eliminated automatically. In our model, however, there exists infinitely multiple low-level
steady-state equilibria when (1 − α)(1 + r) = 1. The equilibria are neither stable nor unstable
locally. A small deviation from any equilibrium will neither be eliminated nor be augmented.
It can also be noticed that bequests will keep increasing in the third case. When bequests reach
some threshold level, the optimal choice will be to invest in human capital and be skilled workers. A
low-level equilibrium is not a trap for unskilled workers if interest rates are high enough or they love
their children so much that they give a disproportionately high weight on their children’s welfare.
After the accumulation of several generations of unskilled workers, a generation of skilled workers
will finally come out.
In the GZ model, however, this interesting case is ruled out because it is assumed (1−α)(1+r) <
1.
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Figure 3.4 The Dynamics of Bequests in GZ Model
3.4.2 Case Two: Skilled Workers as Borrowers
If an individual decides to invest in human capital in the first period, she will become a skilled
worker in the second period. The indivisible investment in human capital is h. If the individual
receives a bequest less than the required investment, she needs to borrow money in credit market.
Again, we assume that the child of a skilled worker will also work as a skilled worker when she
grows up. The maximization problem is
max
c,b
V2(x) = αlnc+ (1− α)V2(b)
subject to
I2 = c+ b = ws + (x− h)(1 + i)
where w2 is the wage of skilled workers.
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Substituting the budget constraint into the objective function, the maximization problem be-
comes
max
b
V2(x) = αln(I2 − b) + (1− α)V2(b)
FOCs w.r.t. b and x are
α
I2 − b
= (1− α)V ′2 (b)
V
′
2 (x) =
α
I2 − b
(1 + i)
Combining the two equations above, we have
V
′
2 (b)
V
′
2 (x)
=
1
(1− α)(1 + i)
Lemma 2. V2(x) is strictly increasing and concave.
Proof. V
′
2 (x) =
α
I2−b(1 + i) > 0, V
′′
2 (x) = − α(I2−b)2 (1 + i)
2 < 0.
Proposition 7. The dynamics of bequests of skilled workers as borrowers depend on the interest
rates of borrowing and the altruism parameter. Specifically speaking,
1. when (1− α)(1 + i) < 1⇒ b < x. Bequests will keep decreasing.
2. when (1− α)(1 + i) = 1⇒ b = x. Bequests will not change.
3. when (1− α)(1 + i) > 1⇒ b > x. Bequests will keep increasing.
The results here are also different from that in GZ. In GZ for skilled workers who need borrowing,
there exists a unique, but unstable, medium-level steady-state equilibrium when (1−α)(1 + i) > 1
which is assumed and the only case discussed in GZ. A tiny deviation from this medium-level
equilibrium will make a big difference: a positive deviation will lead to the locally stable high-level
equilibrium while a negative deviation will lead to the locally stable low-level equilibrium.
Our results show that the dynamics of bequests are more rich. When (1−α)(1+i) < 1, bequests
will decrease across generations and finally the new generation will choose to be unskilled workers.
When (1 − α)(1 + i) = 1, bequests will keep the same and every generation will borrow to invest
in human capital to be skilled workers. When (1− α)(1 + i) > 1, bequests will increase and finally
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the new generation will have enough money to cover the investment of education. At that time,
the individual will be a skilled worker and a lender at the same time.
3.4.3 Case Three: Skilled Workers as Lenders
If an individual receives enough bequest, she can not only invest in human capital, but also lend
to the rest. It is also assumed that the child of a skilled worker as a lender will also be a skilled
worker. The maximization problem is
max
c,b
V3(x) = αlnc+ (1− α)V3(b)
subject to
I3 = c+ b = ws + (x− h)(1 + r)
Substituting the budget constraint into the objective function, the maximization problem be-
comes
max
b
V3(x) = αln(I3 − b) + (1− α)V3(b)
FOCs w.r.t. b and x are
α
I3 − b
= (1− α)V ′3 (b)
V
′
3 (x) =
α
I3 − b
(1 + r)
Combining the two equations above, we have
V
′
3 (b)
V
′
3 (x)
=
1
(1− α)(1 + r)
Lemma 3. V3(x) is strictly increasing and concave.
Proof. V
′
3 (x) =
α
I3−b(1 + r) > 0, V
′′
3 (x) = − α(I3−b)2 (1 + r)
2 < 0.
Proposition 8. The dynamics of bequests of skilled workers as lenders depend on the lending
interest rates and the altruism parameter. Specifically speaking,
1. when (1− α)(1 + r) < 1⇒ b < x. Bequests will keep decreasing.
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2. when (1− α)(1 + r) = 1⇒ b = x. Bequests will not change.
3. when (1− α)(1 + r) > 1⇒ b > x. Bequests will keep increasing.
In the GZ model where (1− α)(1 + r) < 1 is assumed, the dynamic is that bequests of skilled
workers as lenders will lead to a locally stable high-level equilibrium. In my model, however, there
is no equilibrium when (1 − α)(1 + r) < 1. On the contrary, bequests will keep decreasing across
generations and finally the new generation has to borrow to invest on human capital, as discussed
in the previous case. When (1 − α)(1 + r) = 1, bequests will stay the same, meaning that the
child will replicate her parent’s life style. When (1 − α)(1 + r) > 1, bequests will increase across
generations. The next generation will still be skilled workers as lenders. The only difference is that
the next generation will have more money to lend.
3.5 Conclusions
We explored the implications of warm glow and pure altruism for fertility and bequests when
they are used to model parental love. We find that the two kinds of preferences have dramatically
different implications for fertility and bequests. In the case of warm glow preferences, bequests have
a relatively simple expression and is independent of wages in the first period. Fertility is positively
related to wages in the first period. The relationship between fertility and wages in the second
period is ambiguous.
In the case of pure altruism, fertility has a relatively simple expression and is independent of
wages in both periods. Bequests are negatively related to wages in the first period. The relationship
between bequests and wages in the second period is ambiguous. In the extended example, we show
that the dynamics of wealth will be different if we use pure altruism to replace warm glow to model
parental love.
Both warm glow and pure altruism are used to model parental love towards their children.
The attributes of the two kinds of love, however, are not the same. Warm glow represents selfish
love. Parents love their children from their own perspective. They care about how much they have
sacrificed for their children. Pure altruism represents selfless love. Parents love their children from
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the perspective of their children. They care about whether their children have a good life. Because
of the huge differences between the two kinds of love, it is not a surprise to find that warm glow
and pure altruism have dramatically different implications for fertility and bequests. The same
behavior with different motivations produces different consequences.
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CHAPTER 4. FERTILITY, PURE ALTRUISM AND HYPERBOLIC
DISCOUNTING
4.1 Introduction
In traditional models of economics, we assume that people discount future utilities at the same
rates. For example, if we assume the discounting rate is δ in a discrete-time model, then period-t
utility (denoted as u(t)) is discounted at the rate δtu(t) at the beginning t = 0. This form of
discounting is known as exponential discounting. It is first proposed by Samuelson (1937). If a
person exhibits exponential discounting preferences, she is able to make optimal plans for every
future period at the beginning and will not change her plans afterwards. We say that this per-
son’s behavior is time-consistent. The assumption of constant time discounting is so strong that
Samuelson himself stated like this, “This third assumption, unlike the previous two, is in the nature
of an hypothesis, subject to refutation by the observable facts.” At the end of Samuelson (1937),
he warned again that, “In conclusion, any connection between utility as discussed here and any
welfare concept is disavowed.” Although exponential discounting is contested both normatively
and descriptively, it is so elegant and easily tractable that it is accepted by the mainstream eco-
nomics quickly and becomes the standardized assumption or even axiom, to some extent, in modern
economics. Samuelson’s warning has been forgotten.
In reality, however, people’s behaviors are not always time-consistent. The assumption of con-
stant time discounting is rejected by observable facts, as Samuelson guessed. Another kind of dis-
counting, hyperbolic discounting, has been proposed to explain time-inconsistent behavior [Phelps
and Pollak (1968); Laibson (1997); O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999)]. Technically speaking, an agent
who discounts hyperbolically gives a fixed discount for all the future utilities based on exponential
discounting. Intuitively, such an agent shows a changing, instead of constant, time discounting and
behaves as present-biased. Under hyperbolic discounting, an agent in the second period will change
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her plans made in the first period if she is naive, meaning that she is not able, at the beginning,
to foresee her optimization problem in the second period. In this case, we say the agent has a self-
control problem. If the agent is sophisticated, she will foresee her optimal second-period decision
in the first period. Using this information, she will make such plans in the first period such that
there is no incentive for her to change her plans in the second period.
Hyperbolic discounting is widely used in many fields of economics. For example, it is used to
explain saving decisions [Laibson et al. (1998); Diamond and Köszegi (2003); Cao and Werning
(2018)], addictive behavior [Gruber and Köszegi (2001)] and fertility patterns across generations
[Gobbi and Goni (2016)]. It is also used to study public policies to deal with the issue of global
warming [Karp (2005)]. In political game theory, hyperbolic discounting has also gained popularity
[Cao and Werning (2016)].
However, there is little research on fertility within one generation under hyperbolic discounting.
Wrede (2011) studies fertility decisions under hyperbolic discounting and assumes that women can
choose to have children in the first two periods of a three-period life. With financial constraints,
fertility decreases due to hyperbolic discounting. Without financial constraints, however, the author
finds that the effect of hyperbolic discounting on fertility becomes ambiguous, depending on whether
children are considered as consumption goods or investment goods. When children are considered
as consumption goods, sophisticated mothers will choose to have more children in both periods.
When children are considered as investment goods, hyperbolic discounting will reduce the fertility
of sophisticated mothers in the second period. Parents are assumed not to be altruistic in this
paper.
Wigniolle (2013) studies the quantity-quality trade-off under hyperbolic discounting. This paper
shows that people in developed countries and developing countries react differently. Specifically
speaking, hyperbolic discounting reduces fertility in developed countries and increases fertility
in developing countries. The results are obtained under very strong assumptions: the cost of
quantity with respect to family income is relatively higher, and the cost of quality relatively lower
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Table 4.1 The Position of This Paper in Literature
Exponential Discounting Hyperbolic Discounting
Warm Glow 1: Special Case of 2 2: Wrede (2011); Wigniolle (2013)
Pure Altruism 3: Barro and Becker(1988) 4: This paper
in developed countries. Parents care about how much education their children will receive. Also,
no financial market exists, since there is no saving behavior.
The two papers above both use warm glow to represent parental love towards their children.
That is, in their model, parents do not care about their children’s lifetime utility. Parents with warm
glow preference care about only how many bequests they leave to their children. Parents with pure
altruism preference, on the contrary, care about their children’s welfare and try to improve their
children’s lifetime utility by leaving bequests. The mechanisms of warm glow and pure altruism
are illustrated in Figure 3.1 in chapter 3. Although the two kinds of preferences require parents to
leave bequests to their children, their implications are quite different.
Becker and Barro (1988), which is the cornerstone of modern fertility economics, incorporates
pure altruism into their model. I will follow this paper and use pure altruism as the benchmark to
explore this issue. However, hyperbolic discounting is not considered in Becker and Barro (1988). It
is necessary to explore fertility decisions under both pure altruism and hyperbolic discounting. The
position of this paper in the literature is illustrated in Table 1. The aim of this paper is to fill in the
hole of case 4. As far as I know, this is the first paper to consider fertility decisions under hyperbolic
discounting with pure altruism preferences. Besides fertility, I also take educational investment in
children as endogenous. I find that parents with hyperbolic discounting preference and full access
to financial markets will have lower fertility. This conclusion is in complete contradiction to Wrede
(2011) which finds that fertility will decrease without financial markets and it is ambiguous with
financial markets. Contrary to Wigniolle (2013), I also find that hyperbolic discounting reduces
fertility in all countries. Finally, I find that educational investment will also be influenced by
hyperbolic discounting.
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Figure 4.1 The Order of Decisions
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 will present the model. I will discuss two cases:
the naive agent’s problem and the sophisticated agent’s problem. Section 4.3 will give an easy
example to demonstrate the two cases. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 The Model
I assume that an agent lives four periods: childhood, young, middle-aged and old. It is assumed
that a child receives education investment from her parent, but does not make any decisions.
Children are assumed to have no consumption for simplicity since they make no decisions. The
childhood period is denoted as period zero.
For simplicity, a family is assumed to include only one parent and her children. So in this
model, the replacement fertility rate is one instead of two. When the agent is young, she receives
a bequest from her parent and makes saving decisions. When middle-aged, she makes fertility and
saving decisions, as well as decisions for her level of education investment in her children. In this
period, her children are born and in childhood. When old, she makes bequest decisions for all of
her children. I also assume that all the children provide the same amount of utility to their parent
and receive the same amount of bequests. Consumption decisions are also made in every period.
All the decisions are made at the beginning of each period. The order of decisions is illustrated in
Figure 4.2.
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From now on I will denote childhood as period 0 and youth as period 1 and so on. Following
the practice of Galor and Zeira (1993), period 0, in which human capital is formed, is ignored in
the analysis. The agent’s wage in the first period is h(e) where e is the educational investment she
receives. I assume h′(e) > 0, h′′(e) < 0. The wage in the second period is (1 + g)h(e), where g is
the growth rate of wages. The agent does not have income in period 3 since she is in retirement.
The agent’s problem is to choose her consumption levels, her number of children, the level of
educational investment she will provide for her children and the level of bequests for her children
to maximize her lifetime utility. I also assume that children’s utility enters parent’s utility function
when bequests are given. This is also the time when children are independent and start to work.
The value function of an agent in period t is denoted as Vt(at) where at is the agent’s wealth at
the beginning of period t. a
′
t is the wealth of the agent’s children at the beginning of their period
t. Time costs of raising n children are (1 + g)h(e)nx which are the only costs for parents. x is the
percentage of a parent’s total time she spends to raise one child. The altruism parameter for n
children is Φ(n). It is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave. I denote the agent in period
t as Self t. So the three Bellman equations are
Self 1:
V1(e, b) = max
c1,c2,c3,n,e′,b′
{
u(c1) + βδu(c2) + βδ
2u(c3) + βδ
2Φ(n)V1(e
′, b′)
}
(4.1)
Self 2:
V2(e, a2) = max
c2,c3,n,e′,b′
{
u(c2) + βδu(c3) + βδΦ(n)V1(e
′, b′)
}
(4.2)
Self 3:
V3(e
′, n, a3) = max
c3,b′
{
u(c3) + Φ(n)V1(e
′, b′)
}
(4.3)
4.2.1 Model 1: A Naive Agent’s Commitment Problem
If a naive agent makes all the optimal decisions in the first period and the decisions are im-
plemented in the following periods, I refer to the sequence of decisions as a commitment. In the
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commitment problem, Self 1 makes all the choices.
V1(e, b) = max
c1,c2,c3,n,e′,b′
{
u(c1) + βδu(c2) + βδ
2u(c3) + βδ
2Φ(n)V1(e
′, b′)
}
(4.4)
subject to
c1 +
c2
R
+
c3
R2
= h(e) + b+
(1 + g)h(e)(1− nx)− ne′
R
− nb
′
R2
:= I (4.5)
I denote the right-hand side as I and denote the solutions in steady states as c∗1, c
∗
2, c
∗
3, n
∗, e∗, b∗.
Proposition 9. In the commitment problem, fertility is determined by the following equation
βδ2R2
Φ(n∗)
n∗
= 1 (4.6)
Proof. Let λ be the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the budget constraint. Optimal consump-
tion choices satisfy
λ = u′(c1) = βδRu
′(c2) = βδ
2R2u′(c3) (4.7)
The optimal education, fertility and bequest conditions read
λn
R
= βδ2Φ(n)
∂V1(e
′, b′)
∂e′
(4.8)
λ
(
(1 + g)h(e)x+ e′
R
+
b′
R2
)
= βδ2Φ′(n)V1(e
′, b′) (4.9)
λn
R2
= βδ2Φ(n)
∂V1(e
′, b′)
∂b′
(4.10)
From the Envelope Theorem we have
∂V1(e, b)
∂e
= λ
[
1 +
(1 + g)(1− nx)
R
]
h′(e) (4.11)
∂V1(e, b)
∂b
= λ (4.12)
So in steady states, the condition above and bequest condition decide fertility
1 = βδ2R2
Φ(n)
n
(4.13)
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Corollary 11. The existence of hyperbolic discounting reduces naive agents’ fertility since dn
∗
dβ > 0.
Proof. β ↓⇒ Φ(n)n ↑⇒ n ↓. Hyperbolic discounting means that β < 1. So fertility also decreases.
Corollary 12. Fertility in the commitment problem is independent of utility function and is de-
termined by four parameters: hyperbolic discounting rate, time discounting rate, interest rate and
altruism parameter.
We can also solve for the optimal education investment.
Proposition 10. In the commitment problem, education in steady state can be determined by the
following equation
h′(e∗)
[
1
R
+
(1 + g)(1− n∗x)
R2
]
= 1 (4.14)
Proof. The two conditions w.r.t. education give the following equation in steady state
βδ2Φ(n)
[
1 +
(1 + g)(1− nx)
R
]
h′(e) =
n
R
(4.15)
Rearranging the equation, we have
βδ2R2
Φ(n)
n
[
1
R
+
(1 + g)(1− nx)
R2
]
h′(e) = 1⇒
[
1
R
+
(1 + g)(1− nx)
R2
]
h′(e) = 1
Corollary 13. Higher wage growth rates lead to higher fertility and more education investment
since dedg > 0.
In order to solve for education investment, we need a specific utility function. Let’s assume that
u(c) = c
1−γ
1−γ and denote ε(c) =
u′(c)c
u(c) , ε(n) =
Φ′(n)n
Φ(n) . From equation (7) and the budget constraint,
we have
c1 =
I
1 + (βδR)
1
γR−1 + (βδ2R2)
1
γR−2
= α1I (4.16)
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c2 =
(βδR)
1
γ I
1 + (βδR)
1
γR−1 + (βδ2R2)
1
γR−2
= (βδR)
1
γα1I (4.17)
c3 =
(βδ2R2)
1
γ I
1 + (βδR)
1
γR−1 + (βδ2R2)
1
γR−2
= (βδ2R2)
1
γα1I (4.18)
where α1 =
1
1+(βδR)
1
γ R−1+(βδ2R2)
1
γ R−2
is the percentage of income that will be consumed in period
1. Substituting the three equations into (4)
V1(e, b) = max
c1,n,e′,b′
{
α−γ1
I1−γ
1− γ
+ βδ2Φ(n)V1(e
′, b′)
}
= max
c1,n,e′,b′
{
u(c1)
α1
+ βδ2Φ(n)V1(e
′, b′)
}
(4.19)
We have three new FOCs which are given as following
b :
∂V1(e, b)
∂b
= u′(c1) (4.20)
b′ : u′(c1)
n
R2
= βδ2Φ(n)
∂V1(e
′, b′)
∂b′
(4.21)
n : u′(c1)
(
(1 + g)h(e)x+ e′
R
+
b′
R2
)
= βδ2Φ′(n)V1(e
′, b′) (4.22)
From (20) and (21) we have
u′(c1) = βδ
2R2
Φ(n)
n
u′(c
′
1) (4.23)
From (23) we have
Φ(n)V1(e
′, b′) = u′(c1)
(
(1+g)h(e)x+e′
R +
b′
R2
)
Φ(n)
βδ2Φ′(n)
= u(c1)c1
(
(1+g)h(e)nx+ne′
R +
nb′
R2
)
ε(c1)
βδ2ε(n)
(4.24)
From the budget constraint and consumption levels we have
c1 +
c2
R
+
c3
R2
=
c1
α1
= h(e) + b+
(1 + g)h(e)
R
−
(
(1 + g)h(e)nx+ ne′
R
+
nb′
R2
)
= I (4.25)
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By combining the two equations above, we have
Φ(n)V1(e
′, b′) =
u(c1)
c1
(
h(e) + b+
(1 + g)h(e)
R
− c1
α1
)
ε(c1)
βδ2ε(n)
(4.26)
From (22) and (23) we also have
V1(e, b) =
u′(c01)
βδ2Φ′(n)
(
(1 + g)h(e0)x+ e
R
+
b
R2
)
=
R2u′(c1)
ε(n)
(
(1 + g)h(e0)x+ e
R
+
b
R2
)
(4.27)
where the superscript of zero denotes the variables of the agent’s parent. Rearranging the
equation above we have
V1(e, b) =
ε(c1)
ε(n)
(
(1 + g)h(e0)xR+ eR+ b
) u(c1)
c1
(4.28)
Substituting (24) and (28) into (19), we have
ε(c1)
ε(n)
(
(1 + g)h(e0)xR+ eR+ b
) u(c1)
c1
=
u(c1)
α1
+
u(c1)
c1
(
h(e) + b+
(1 + g)h(e)
R
− c1
α1
)
ε(c1)
ε(n)
(4.29)
In equilibrium, we have
c∗1 = α1
ε(c∗1)
ε(n∗)− ε(c∗1)
(
(1 + g)h(e∗)xR+ e∗R− h(e∗)− (1 + g)h(e
∗)
R
)
(4.30)
If educational investment is fixed and the elasticities of consumption and fertility are constant,
we can see that the existence of hyperbolic discounting increases the consumption in the first period
and reduces the consumption in the second and third periods.
From (25) and the equation above, we have the optimal amount of bequest for each child
b∗ =
R2
R2 − n∗
 ((1 + g)h(e∗)xR+ e∗R)
(
ε(c∗1)
ε(n∗)−ε(c∗1)
+ 1
R2
)
−
ε(n∗)
ε(n∗)−ε(c∗1)
(
h(e∗) + (1+g)h(e
∗)
R
)
 (4.31)
4.2.2 Model 2: A Sophisticated Agent’s Time-Consistent Problem
One characteristic of a naive agent with hyperbolic discounting preferences is that the agent
will change her first-period optimal plans since the agent is not able to foresee the future in the first
period. However, a sophisticated agent can foresee the future and prevent changes in her decisions
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in later periods. In order to make time-consistent plans in the first period, we must consider the
problem backwards. First we consider Self 3’s choices and then we take these choices as given and
consider Self 2’s optimal choices. Then, we take Self 2 and 3’s choices as given and consider Self
1’s optimal choices. In this way, the agent will not change her optimal plans. We call a solution
gained by the backward method as a time consistent solution. In this problem, Self 3 chooses c3
and b′ given e′, a3 and n; Self 2 chooses c2, n, e
′ and a3 given a2 and e; and Self 1 chooses c1 and a2
given e and b. The problems are described as follows:
Self 3:
W3(e
′, a3, n) = max
c3,b′
{
u(c3) + Φ(n)W1(e
′, b′)
}
(4.32)
subject to
c3 = a3 − nb′ (4.33)
Denote the solutions to this problem c3 = c
W
3 (e
′, a3, n) and b = b
W (e′, a3, n).
Self 2 solves:
W2(a2, e) = max
c2,a3,n,e′
{
u(c2) + βδW3(e
′, a3, n)
}
(4.34)
subject to
c2 = a2 + (1 + g)h(e)(1− nx)− ne′ −
a3
R
(4.35)
Denote the solutions to this problem c2 = c
W
2 (a2, e), a3 = a
W
3 (a2, e) and n = n
W (a2, e).
Self 1 solves:
W1(e, b) = max
c1,a2
{u(c1) + βδW2(a2, e)} (4.36)
subject to
c1 = h(e) + b−
a2
R
(4.37)
Proposition 11. In the time consistent problem, fertility is determined by the following equation
(βδR)2
Φ(nW )
nW
= 1 (4.38)
Proof. Self 3. The first order condition w.r.t. bequest is
u′(c3)n = Φ(n)
∂W1(e
′, b′)
∂b′
(4.39)
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The Envelope Theorem conditions are
∂W3(e
′, a3, n)
∂e′
= Φ(n)
∂W1(e
′, b′)
∂e′
(4.40)
∂W3(e
′, a3, n)
∂a3
= u′(c3) (4.41)
∂W3(e
′, a3, n)
∂n
= −u′(c3)b′ + Φ′(n)W1(e′, b′) (4.42)
Self 2. The first order conditions w.r.t. a3, e
′ and n are
u′(c2)
R
= βδ
∂W3(e
′, a3, n)
∂a3
(4.43)
u′(c2)n = βδ
∂W3(e
′, a3, n)
∂e′
(4.44)
u′(c2)(1 + g)h(e)x =
∂W3(e
′, a3, n)
∂n
(4.45)
The Envelope Theorem gives the following condition
∂W2(a2, e)
∂a2
= u′(c2) (4.46)
∂W2(a2, e)
∂e
= u′(c2)(1 + g)h
′(e)(1− nx) (4.47)
Self 1. The first order condition w.r.t. a2 and Envelope Theorem read
u′(c1)
R
= βδ
∂W2(a2, e)
∂a2
(4.48)
∂W1(e, b)
∂e
= u′(c1)h
′(e) + βδ
∂W2(a2, e)
∂e
(4.49)
∂W1(e, b)
∂b
= u′(c1) (4.50)
From the FOCs and Envelope Theorem conditions w.r.t. a2 and a3, we have the equation to
describe consumption
u′(c1) = βδRu
′(c2) = (βδR)
2u′(c3) (4.51)
In steady states, we also have
u′(c3)n = Φ(n)
∂W1(e, b)
∂b
= Φ(n)u′(c1) (4.52)
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Combining the two conditions above to eliminate consumption, we have
(βδR)2
Φ(n)
n
= 1
Corollary 14. Fertility in the time consistent problem is also independent of utility function and
is determined by four parameters: hyperbolic discounting rate, time discounting rate, interest rate
and altruism parameter.
We can see that in both the commitment problem and the time consistent problem, fertility is
determined by the altruism, interest rate, time discounting and hyperbolic discounting parameters.
Wrede (2011)shows that, with a perfect financial market, the effects of hyperbolic discounting
on fertility are ambiguous, depending on whether the children are considered as consumption or
investment goods. The effects are negative when children are considered only as investment goods.
The two results are consistent in the sense that pure altruism is essentially the same as considering
children as investment goods. In pure altruism, a child’s lifetime utility will enter her parent’s
utility function. Therefore, a parent stops sacrificing time and money after her children become
independent, but the parent can continue to receive utility from her children thereafter. So in pure
altruism, there is a time lag between giving resources and obtaining utility. The key feature of
investment is exactly the same. So pure altruism is the same as considering children as investment
goods for parents.
In the warm glow preference of Wigniolle (2013), the effects of hyperbolic discounting are
different in developed and developing countries. Hyperbolic discounting tends to reduce fertility in
developed countries but increase fertility in developing countries. Both our paper and Wigniolle
(2013) assume that time costs are the only costs of raising children. The difference is that Wigniolle
(2013) also assumes a non-wage income and that the cost of quantity of children is relatively
higher with respect to family income in developed countries since women there will have more
opportunities in the labor markets. The positive effects of hyperbolic discounting on fertility in
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developing countries are possible only in the case that the parent gives her children zero education
investment at the optimum. This case is quite rare in most developing countries.
We can use wage growth rates to distinguish between developed and developing countries since
wage growth rates are higher in developing countries; when we do so, our model shows that hyper-
bolic discounting reduces fertility in both developed and developing countries. I think this result
is more consistent with reality because fertility rates are decreasing in the majority of developing
countries.
Last, there is no corner solution for fertility in my model. This is because the solutions are
in steady states. Parents have the same life patterns as their children. If there are no children,
equilibrium solutions in steady states will also disappear. Although many individuals choose not
to have children, we can consider the agent in this model as a representative agent of the whole
population. Then fertility in the model is the average of the whole society and will not have a
corner solution.
Proposition 12. In the time consistent problem, education is determined by the following equation
h′(eW )
[
1
R
+
(1 + g)(1− nWx))
R2
]
= 1 (4.53)
Proof. Proof Combine the four conditions about education, we have
u′(c2) = βδ
∂W3(e
′, a3, n)
∂e′
= βδΦ(n)
∂W1(e
′, b′)
∂e′
= βδΦ(n)
[
u′(c1)h
′(e) + βδ
∂W2(a2, e)
∂e
]
⇒ u′(c2) = βδΦ(n)
[
u′(c1)h
′(e) + βδu′(c2)(1 + g)h
′(e)(1− nx)
]
(4.54)
Combining this equation with the equation describing the marginal utility of consumption, we
have
1 = (βδR)2
Φ(nW )
nW
h′(e)
[
1
R
+
(1 + g)(1− nWx)
R2
]
(4.55)
1 = h′(e)
[
1
R
+
(1 + g)(1− nWx)
R2
]
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Again, there is no corner solution for education. In Wigniolle (2013), it is possible to have
corner solutions for education. The reason is that the author assumes a free and compulsory public
education. If we consider the whole society as a representative individual and consider the optimal
education investment as the sum of public and private education investment, there is no corner
solution. Public education subsidies are taxed from individuals.
Corollary 15. Result In the time consistent problem, fertility is lower while education is higher:
nW < n∗, eW > e∗.
Proof. Dividing the two equations from the two propositions about fertility, we have
β
Φ(nW )
nW
=
Φ(n∗)
n∗
⇒ Φ(n
W )
nW
>
Φ(n∗)
n∗
⇒ nW < n∗
Education is determined by the same function form.
nW < n∗ ⇒ 1− nWx > 1− n∗x⇒ h′(eW ) < h′(e∗)⇒ eW > e∗
Again, let’s assume the same utility function as in the model of commitment problem. With
similar calculation, we have
cW1 = α2
ε(cW1 )
ε(nW )− ε(cW1 )
(
(1 + g)h(eW )xR+ eWR− h(eW )− (1 + g)h(e
W )
R
)
(4.56)
bW =
R2
R2 − nW
 ((1 + g)h(eW )xR+ eWR)
(
ε(cW1 )
ε(nW )−ε(cW1 )
+ 1
R2
)
−
ε(nW )
ε(nW )−ε(cW1 )
(
h(eW ) + (1+g)h(e
W )
R
)
 (4.57)
where α2 =
1
1+(βδR)
1
γ R−1+(βδR)
2
γ R−2
.
Wigniolle (2013) also finds that fertility is not continuous in the entire range of possible fertility.
For example, a small change in wages or education costs may lead to a jump in fertility. Our model
does not predict this kind of discontinuity in fertility.
4.3 An Example
Let’s assume that u(c) = c
1−γ
1−γ ,Φ(n) =
n1−ε
1−ε , h(e) = e
σ, 0 < γ, ε, σ < 1. We will focus on the
analysis of fertility and education since bequest is too complicated.
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4.3.1 Model 1: A Naive Agent’s Commitment Problem
First, we can calculate fertility from the first proposition
βδ2R2
Φ(n∗)
n∗
= βδ2R2
(n∗)−ε
(1− ε)
= 1⇒ n∗ =
(
βδ2R2
1− ε
)1/ε
It is easy to see that the equilibrium fertility is below the replacement rate if
βδ2R2 < 1− ε⇒ β < 1− ε
δ2R2
.
Then we can have education after fertility is determined,
h′(e∗)
[
1
R
+
(1 + g)(1− n∗x)
R2
]
= σ(e∗)σ−1
[
1
R
+
(1 + g)(1− n∗x)
R2
]
= 1
⇒ e∗ =
[
σ
R2
(
R+ (1 + g)
(
1− x
(
βδ2R2
1− ε
)1/ε))] 11−σ
4.3.2 Model 2: A Sophisticated Agent’s Time-Consistent Problem
The fertility of sophisticated agents is determined by the following equation
(βδR)2
Φ(nW )
nW
= (βδR)2
(nW )1−ε
1− ε
= 1⇒ nW =
(
βδR
1− ε
)2/ε
In this case, the equilibrium fertility is below the replacement rate if
βδR < 1− ε⇒ β < 1− ε
δR
Education is given by
eW =
[
σ
R2
(
R+ (1 + g)
(
1− x
(
βδR
1− ε
)2/ε))] 11−σ
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4.3.3 Discussion
We can see that fertility is determined by interest rates, discount rates and the altruism param-
eter in both the commitment problem and the time consistent problem. This result is consistent
with Becker and Barro (1988). The reason why absolute wages don’t appear in the optimal fertility
solutions is that time costs are the only costs of raising children. So the costs of raising children
relative to family income are the same. Taxes will not be effective commitment devices to guarantee
the fertility of naive agents, which are higher than those of sophisticated agents. If we include a
fixed cost of raising children, taxation will be effective. Actually, a tax on childlessness was imposed
for a long time in the Soviet Union and in other Communist countries. For many other countries
with low fertility rates such as Japan and northern European countries, families with more babies
can enjoy tax exemptions and various other subsidies. The reason for governments to engage in
such interventions in family planning is that the social benefits of producing additional children are
higher than the private benefits. So, interventions are needed to achieve the social optimum.
Interest rates play a key role in determining fertility rates. The result is quite straightforward.
In a world without financial constraints, pure altruism implies that parents regard children as in-
vestment goods. Interest rates, being the rate of return on investments, will consequently play a
key role in determining fertility. The conclusion is that higher interest rates will lead to higher fer-
tility rates. The conclusion is consistent with reality. Interest rates and fertility rates in developing
countries are both usually higher than those in developed countries.
4.4 Conclusions
In this paper, I have investigated the fertility decisions of agents with hyperbolic discounting
and pure altruism preferences. I have also included education investment and bequest decisions.
I consider the problem in two situations: the commitment problem of naive agents and the time-
consistent problem of sophisticated agents. First, I find that, in both cases, fertility decreases
because of hyperbolic discounting. The reason is that hyperbolic discounting discounts more than
exponential discounting and the parent gains utility only after raising children.
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I also find that sophisticated agents will choose to have fewer children and invest more into
each of them, compared to naive agents. In the commitment problem, Self 1 makes all the choices.
So there is no hyperbolic discounting between the second and third periods. That is to say, in the
commitment problem, the time gap between the costs and benefits of raising children is smaller
than that in the time consistent problem. When parents are sophisticated, which means that they
can imagine the future, they will choose to have fewer children.
There are many reasons to explain the decline in fertility. For example, the increasing costs
of raising children, widespread adoption of higher education of women and more accessible and
affordable contraception methods. This paper tries to look at the issue from a new perspective and
finds that it can explain the decline in fertility theoretically. I believe that the idea discussed in this
paper illuminates one of the many reasons for the fertility decline. Also this paper contributes to the
methodology of solving time inconsistent problems in the framework of pure altruism. Interestingly,
the paper also finds that having children is essentially similar to investment for parents with pure
altruism preferences.
There are several natural extensions of the paper. First, credit constraints can be introduced
to relax the assumption of perfect financial markets. Second, the costs of raising children can be
relaxed from linear to concave with respect to the number of children because the marginal time
costs of raising children are decreasing; especially if the age gaps between children are small. Also,
non-time costs can be included, too. These extensions may be suitable for future inquiry.
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APPENDIX. PROOF OF CHAPTER 2
.1 The Proof of AR(1) Case
Plugging (1)(2)(4) into (5), we have
Ui = (1− α)log(yi,t−1 − Ii,t−1) + αu+ αθplogIi,t−1 + αpeit (.1)
FOC w.r.t. education investment can be written as
∂Ui
∂Ii,t−1
= − 1− α
yi,t−1 − Ii,t−1
+
αθp
Ii,t−1
= 0 (.2)
Optimal investment can be obtained from equation (11)
Ii,t−1 =
αθp
1− α(1− θp)
yi,t−1 (.3)
Substituting (12) into (2), we have
Sit = θlog
αθp
1− α(1− θp)
yi,t−1 + eit (.4)
From equation (4), we have
logyi,t−1 = u+ pSi,t−1 (.5)
Plugging (14) into (13)
Sit = θlog
αθp
1− α(1− θp)
+ θu+ θpSi,t−1 + eit (.6)
Lagging (15) by one generation and multiplying it by λ
λSi,t−1 = λθlog
αθp
1− α(1− θp)
+ λθu+ λθpSi,t−2 + λei,t−1 (.7)
Subtracting (16) from (15)
Sit − λSi,t−1 = (1− λ)
[
αθp
1− α(1− θp)
+ θu
]
+ θpSi,t−1 − λθpSi,t−2 + eit − λei,t−1 (.8)
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Combining (3) and rearranging the equation above, we can get
Sit = δ + (1− λ)θ
[
u+
αp
1− α(1− θp)
]
+ (λ+ θp)Si,t−1 − λθpSi,t−2 + vit (.9)
So, under the assumption of AR(1) process, Sit can be written as
Sit = Ω1 + (λ+ θp)Si,t−1 − λθpSi,t−2 + vit
where Ω1 = δ + (1− λ)θ
[
u+ αp1−α(1−θp)
]
.
.2 The Proof of AR(2) Case
Lagging (15) by one generation and multiplying it by λ1
λ1Si,t−1 = λ1θlog
αθp
1− α(1− θp)
+ λ1θu+ λ1θpSi,t−2 + λ1ei,t−1 (.10)
Lagging (15) by two generations and multiplying it by λ2
λ2Si,t−1 = λ2θlog
αθp
1− α(1− θp)
+ λ2θu+ λ2θpSi,t−2 + λ2ei,t−1 (.11)
Subtracting (19) and (20) from (15)
Si,t = (1−λ1−λ2)
[
θlog
αθp
1− α(1− θp)
+ θu
]
+(λ1+θp)Si,t−1+(λ2−λ1θp)Si,t−2−λ2θpSi,t−2+eit−λ1ei,t−1−λ2ei,t−1
(.12)
Combining (7) and (21), we have
Si,t = δ+(1−λ1−λ2)θ
[
u+ log
αp
1− α(1− θp)
]
+(λ1 +θp)Si,t−1 +(λ2−λ1θp)Si,t−2−λ2θpSi,t−3 +vit (.13)
So, under the assumption of AR(2) process, Sit can be written as
Si,t = Ω2 + (λ1 + θp)Si,t−1 + (λ2 − λ1θp)Si,t−2 − λ2θpSi,t−3 + vit
where Ω2 = δ + (1− λ1 − λ2)θ
[
u+ log αp1−α(1−θp)
]
.
